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Introduction 
There have been some recent attempts by philosophers to con-
vince us to take seriously the threat of epiphenomenalism about 
consciousness. Ned Block [1995] argues that many of the com-
mon arguments in favor of phenomenological causation are falla-
cious because the conclusion that phenomenal consciousness CP-
consciousness) is causal is reached based on evidence which only 
shows that direct access to information (A-consciousness) serves 
some function. David Chalmers [1996] develops an argument for 
epiphenomenalism based on similar considerations. For Chalmers, 
it is the "direct availability for global control" [Chalmers 1996, p. 
225] of information that does all of the work, while the associated 
phenomenal "feel" plays no part in behavior. I will argue that 
there is no way to generate an argument for epiphenomenalism out 
of the conceptual distinction between access-consciousness and 
phenomenal consciousness without begging the question. In fact, 
the tight empirical link between access-consciousness and phe-
nomenal consciousness, instead of leading us toward epiphenom-
enalism, should only strengthen our conviction that phenomeno-
logical properties are causal properties. 
The hard problem 
For Chalmers, as for Block, we can distinguish two senses of 
"consciousness". There is first of all phenomenal consciousness, 
for which Chalmers suggests we ought to reserve the name "con-
sciousness". This is the puzzling "what it's like" character of ex-
perience. Then there is psychological consciousness, which 
Chalmers calls "awareness" and characterizes as the "direct avail-
ability for global control" [Chalmers 1996, p. 225]. "Awareness 
can be broadly analyzed as a state wherein we have access to some 
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information, and can use that information in the control of 
behavior...This is clearly a functional notion" [ibid, p. 28]. While 
there is lots of scientific work to be done before we have a com-
plete account of this kind of access, explaining awareness poses 
no metaphysical mysteries. Discovering the nature of attention, 
control of behavior, reportability, etc. are the "easy problems" of 
consciousness. "All of them are straightforwardly vulnerable to 
explanation in terms of computational or neural mechanisms" 
[Chalmers 1995, p. 10]. The "hard problem" arises when we try to 
explain consciousness as such. Why is awareness accompanied 
by phenomenal consciousness? "It is widely agreed that experi-
ence arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explana-
tion of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing 
give rise to a rich inner life at all?" [ibid, p. 11]. 
Like Block, Chalmers thinks that the failure to recognize this 
distinction between awareness and consciousness, and thus the 
difference between the easy and the hard problems, has resulted in 
premature optimism about the possibility of a solution to the mys-
tery of consciousness. According to Chalmers, theorists often claim 
to be explaining full-blooded phenomenal consciousness when they 
only address different aspects of awareness: "At the close, the au-
thor declares that consciousness has turned out to be tractable after 
all, but the reader is left feeling like the victim of a bait-and-switch. 
The hard problem remains untouched" [ibid]. This sounds very 
similar to Block's complaint that a story about the function of A-
consciousness does not lead immediately to an account of the func-
tion of P-consciousness. But Chalmers uses this worry as the foun-
dation for a full-blown argument for epiphenomenalism. 
From zombies to epiphenomenalism 
We should note that Chalmers is hesitant to embrace the term 
"epiphenomenalism", offering the following explanation: "I do not 
describe my view as epiphenomenalism. The question of the causal 
relevance of experience remains open, and a more detailed theory 
of both causation and of experience will be required before the 
issue can be settled" [Chalmers 1996, p. 160]. But his reasons for 
this qualification do not question the spirit of the epiphenomenalist 
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argument at all. For example, he flirts with the idea of panpsychism: 
"Perhaps, as Russell suggested, at least some of the intrinsic prop-
erties of the physical are themselves a variety of phenomenal prop-
erty?" [ibid, p. 154]. If this were the case, then phenomenal prop-
erties would be causally relevant since they would be central to 
the physical constitution of the world. Still, my conscious experi-
ences as subjective states of my mind would not make any differ-
ence in the world. Chalmers admits that "the view makes experi-
ence explanatorily irrelevant. We can give explanations of behav-
ior in purely physical or computational terms, terms that neither 
involve nor imply phenomenology" [ibid, p. 156]. Chalmers says 
this only "looks something like epiphenomenalism" [ibid, p. 150], 
or "feels epiphenomenalistic" [ibid, p. 156], describing his view 
as "epiphenomenalistic to a first approximation" [ibid]. I think a 
view according to which consciousness makes no difference in 
behavior can fairly be described as epiphenomenalistic through 
and through, but whatever it should be called, it is to Chalmers' 
case for this position that I now turn. 
Armed with what I consider the reasonable conviction that 
consciousness cannot be functionally or physically defined, 
Chalmers puts forth the following argument against the logical 
supervenience of consciousness: 
Whatever functional account of human cognition 
we give, there is a further question: Why is this 
kind of functioning accompanied by conscious-
ness? No such further question arises for psycho-
logical states. If one asked about a given func-
tional model of learning, "Why is this functioning 
accompanied by learning?" the appropriate answer 
is a semantic answer: "Because all it means to learn 
is to function like this". There is no correspond-
ing analysis of the concept of consciousness. Phe-
nomenal states, unlike psychological states, are not 
defined by the causal roles that they play. It fol-
lows that explaining how some causal role is 
played is not sufficient to explain consciousness. 
After we have explained the performance of a 
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given function, the fact that consciousness accom-
panies the performance of the function (if indeed 
it does) remains quite unexplained. 
... no matter what functional account of cognition 
one gives, it seems logically possible that that ac-
count could be instantiated without any accompa-
nying consciousness, [ibid, pp. 46-47] 
This is to accept the logical possibility of a philosophical zombie: 
What is going on in my zombie twin? He is physi-
cally identical to me, and we may also suppose 
that he is embedded in an identical environment. 
He will certainly be identical to me functionally: 
he will be processing the same sort of informa-
tion, reacting in similar ways to inputs, with his 
internal configurations being modified appropri-
ately and with indistinguishable behavior result-
ing... It is just that none of this functioning will be 
accompanied by any real conscious experience. 
There will be no phenomenal feel. There is noth-
ing it is like to be a zombie, [ibid, p. 95] 
And this, he thinks, leads straight to epiphenomenalism: 
The basic shape of the argument is clear: if it is 
possible to subtract the phenomenal from our 
world and still retain a causally closed world Z, 
then everything that happens in Z has a causal 
explanation that is independent of the phenom-
enal, as there is nothing phenomenal in Z. But 
everything that happens in Z also happens in our 
world, so the causal explanation that applies in Z 
applies equally here. So the phenomenal is caus-
ally irrelevant. Even if conscious experience were 
absent, the behavior might have been caused in 
exactly the same, [ibid, p. 150] 
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This case for epiphenomenalism can be summarized as follows: 
Absent qualia zombies are possible. This means that there could 
be a creature which lacks consciousness but which has the same 
functional structure as I have. It is therefore possible that the same 
causal roles could be performed without any phenomenology. It 
is possible, then, for phenomenological properties to be 
epiphenomenal. This means, though, that there is a possible world 
in which everything happens exactly as it happens in the actual 
world, but in which everything can be explained without reference 
to consciousness. But since the two worlds are functionally iden-
tical, then the same functional account explains the happenings of 
both worlds. Therefore, everything that occurs in the actual world 
can be explained without appeal to consciousness. This means 
that consciousness plays no causal role in the actual world. 
The weakness of this argument is with the first premise which 
states that absent qualia zombies are possible. As Block has pointed 
out, this claim is ambiguous. It could be given the following three 
readings: 
Absent Qualia Premise, Strong Reading: If absent 
qualia are possible, then pain could lack qualita-
tive character, and its lacking qualitative charac-
ter would make no difference to its causal role. 
[Block 1980, p. 265J 
AQ Premise, Weak Reading: If absent qualia are 
possible, there could be ersatz pain that has the 
same causal role as pain, [ibid, p. 266] 
AQ Premise, Weaker Still Reading: If absent qualia 
are possible, ersatz pain is possible, [ibid, p. 271 ] 
According to the strong reading, my pains could lack their qualita-
tive character without any change in my mental function; accord-
ing to the weak reading, some creature's ersatz pain could lack 
qualitative character and yet have the same (total) causal powers 
as my hurtful pain; according to the still weaker reading, this other 
creature's ersatz pain could play the same role in its mental life as 
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my hurtful pain plays in mine, yet the total causal powers of our 
pains might differ (e.g., my pain and its ersatz pain might result in 
the same behavior in like circumstances but have different effects 
on an EEG [ibid]). 
These distinctions are crucial here because Chalmers needs 
the strong reading in order for the argument for epiphenomenal-
ism to go through. The two weaker AQ premises provide no sup-
port whatsoever for epiphenomenalism. If either of these weaker 
readings is true, it only shows that something else could have ex-
actly the same effects (limited to the context of psychological ex-
planation on the weak reading; in all contexts on the still weaker 
reading) as my phenomenological states. But the fact that some-
thing else could do the job does not make the thing that actually 
does the job an epiphenomenon. To take one of Block's illustra-
tions, "mousetraps with springs can be functionally identical to 
mousetraps without springs. (So an "absent spring" hypothesis is 
true.) But it would be silly to conclude that the presence or ab-
sence of springs make no difference to the causal consequences of 
the states of those mousetraps that have springs" [ibid, p. 262]. 
Furthermore, even if it were true that the same functional explana-
tion could account for both my behavior and the behavior of my 
zombie twin, this would not necessarily entail that my conscious 
states are epiphenomenal. It might be the case that I would behave 
exactly the same if the phenomenal could be subtracted from my 
mental life, and yet the phenomenal could still be causal. The 
presence of the qualitative character might, for example, affect the 
manner in which the behavior is caused. In such a case, my phe-
nomenal states would be causal, even though the functional expla-
nation of my zombie twin could equally account for my behavior. 
Chalmers seems to recognize this when he describes his zom-
bie twin as physically, functionally, and contextually identical to 
himself, lacking only consciousness. If this were possible, then 
the threat of epiphenomenalism would be more serious. If for ex-
ample, my zombie twin's body and environment are physically 
identical to my own, then it cannot be that my phenomenal states 
are causing the same behavior in a different way, because that dif-
ference would have to turn up in some manner in the physical pro-
cesses of our bodies or of our worlds. But this is ruled out by how 
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Chalmers sets up the thought-experiment. Epiphenomenalism 
about consciousness becomes a real worry if the absence of con-
sciousness would not change behavior or the way that the behav-
ior is caused. 
The problem for Chalmers is that, far from showing that the 
strong version of the AQ premise is true, he never gets beyond the 
weakest version of the premise, the idea that there could be ersatz 
pain. The only support he can give for the strong AQ premise, 
besides his insistence that it just seems obvious to him, is the "in-
direct support" from "considering nonstandard realizations of my 
functional organization" [Chalmers 1996, p. 97]. That is, he tries 
to use the plausibility of the idea that ersatz pain is possible to 
pump our intuitions toward the idea that my pain could function 
the same without its qualitative character. So Chalmers mentions 
Block's idea that "the people of a large nation such as China might 
organize themselves so that they realize a causal organization iso-
morphic to that of my brain" [ibid]; we might also consider "my 
silicon isomorph, who is organized like me but who has silicon 
chips where I have neurons" [ibid]. These examples, while far-
fetched, indeed seem like open possibilities. But now consider the 
moral that Chalmers draws from these possibilities: 
All that matters here is that the idea that such a 
system lacks conscious experience is coherent. A 
meaningful possibility is being expressed, and it 
is an open question whether consciousness arises 
or not... Whether such an isomorph would in fact 
be conscious is controversial, but it seems to most 
people that those who deny this are expressing a 
coherent possibility. From these cases it follows 
that the existence of my conscious experience is 
not logically entailed by the facts about my func-
tional organization [ibid]. 
If this last sentence is interpreted to mean that the existence of 
conscious experience just like mine is not logically entailed by the 
facts about my functional organization, then it would seem that 
this conclusion is supported by the possibility of nonstandard real-
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izations of my functional organization. If a silicon, nonconscious 
functional duplicate of me is possible, then clearly consciousness 
does not logically supervene on functional structure. But why is it 
plausible that my silicon functional isomorph might lack conscious-
ness? Because if we accept the supervenience of the mental on the 
physical, the idea that there is no mental difference without a physi-
cal difference, then we hold the different lower-level implementa-
tions of our minds responsible for the mental difference between 
me and my zombie twin. But then Chalmers claims that these first 
thought-experiments, if we think that they represent possible sce-
narios, ought to make us think that I could have a zombie func-
tional twin which is also physically identical to me: 
For it is clear that there is no more of a conceptual 
entailment from biochemistry to consciousness 
than there is from silicon or from a group of ho-
munculi. If the silicon isomorph without conscious 
experience is conceivable, we need only substi-
tute neurons for silicon in the conception while 
leaving functional organization constant, and we 
have my zombie twin. Nothing in this substitu-
tion could force experience into the conception; 
these implementational differences are simply not 
the sort of thing that could be conceptually rel-
evant to experience. So consciousness fails to logi-
cally supervene on the physical, [ibid] 
This drastically changes what we are supposed to imagine. It was 
the physical differences that made the original cases make sense. 
Now Chalmers asks us to do away with any physical difference, 
whether local or global, between me and my zombie twin, and 
then he suggests that this is just as coherent a possibility as the 
original case. But if we accept this second possibility, we have 
already accepted that consciousness is epiphenomenal from the 
start. At this point, though, Chalmers is supposed to be giving us 
a reason to think that the first premise in the argument for epiphe-
nomenalism, the strong AQ premise, is true. 
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Chalmers maintains that the logical possibility of his zombie 
twin as he has described it, a being both physically and function-
ally identical to him but lacking consciousness, seems perfectly 
obvious and "the burden is on the opponent to give us some idea of 
where the contradiction might lie in the apparently quite coherent 
description" [ibid, p. 99], But what we have seen is that the AQ 
premise is only compelling when taken in one of its weaker senses, 
and the acceptance of either of these weaker premises does not 
commit you to the strong premise. If, say, the weakest premise is 
true so that ersatz pain is possible, which seems at least prima 
facie plausible to me, then Chalmers is right when he makes the 
general claim that it is logically possible for a functional isomorph 
of me to lack consciousness. But it still may be logically impos-
sible for a physical, functional, and contextual duplicate of me to 
lack consciousness, because my pains might not be able to per-
form their functions without their qualitative character. Even if a 
silicon, nonconscious, functional duplicate of me is possible, this 
grounds no conclusions about the potency of my phenomenologi-
cal states. My zombie twin's silicon constitution might make all 
the difference in the world. Maybe more information can be stored 
and efficiently processed in silicon chips than in neurons, so that 
he can get by without consciousness, while I need consciousness 
to function as I do with the neural equipment that I have. 
We are in a position, then, to give a simple response to 
Chalmers' challenge. How might it be logically impossible for a 
physical and functional duplicate of me to lack consciousness? 
Just in case the correct functional characterization of me requires 
consciousness, that is, just in case epiphenomenalism is false about 
my phenomenological states. Chalmers claims again and again 
that "no matter what functional account of cognition one gives, it 
seems logically possible that that account could be instantiated 
without any accompanying consciousness" [ibid, p. 47, my ital-
ics]. But this is just false if consciousness plays a functional role. 
If this is the case, then it would be logically impossible for the 
functional account to be instantiated without consciousness. Of 
course, it would not be logically impossible in the same way that it 
would be logically impossible for a functional account of learning 
to be instantiated without any learning. The learning just is the 
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function, while the consciousness would not be exhausted by the 
function. Still, if the functional account includes a phenomeno-
logical state in its explanation of some behavior, then it would be 
logically impossible for that behavior to occur without the phe-
nomenological state. Why, at this point, can I imagine that any 
function could be accomplished without consciousness? Simply 
because our functional accounts are so incomplete. It may turn 
out that we can give a complete functional account of the mind 
without including consciousness, but it may not. We have to wait 
to see what the functional account requires before ruling out a 
priori that consciousness matters. 
The upshot is that Chalmers' argument for epiphenomenalism 
begs the question. He argues that, since it is imaginable and thus 
logically possible for there to be a physical and functional dupli-
cate of me that lacks consciousness, and since all of my zombie 
twin's behavior can be explained without reference to conscious-
ness, then all of my behavior, which is identical to my twin's, can 
be explained without reference to consciousness. But how can 
this justify epiphenomenalism when the first premise openly as-
sumes it? To say that any functional account of my behavior might 
be implemented in a nonconscious being is just to say that none of 
my phenomenological states make a difference. It may turn out 
that the functional account of any particular mental process will 
not require reference to consciousness. This, though, is only imag-
inable because, as Block puts it, the concept of phenomenal con-
sciousness is not a functional concept. 
The failure of Chalmers' position is evident from the begin-
ning, since the way he carves up the problems of consciousness is 
itself question-begging. He assumes throughout that the "easy 
problems" can fall without a theory of phenomenal consciousness, 
which is just to assume that consciousness plays absolutely no 
causal role. He asks, "How do we explain the performance of a 
function? By specifying a mechanism that performs the function. 
Here, neurophysiology and cognitive modelling are perfect for the 
task" [Chalmers 1995, p. 12]. But the question is whether or not it 
is possible to fully explain the mechanism without appealing to 
subjective consciousness. If not, then, as David Hodgson puts it, 
"the easy problems ain't so easy" [Hodgson 1996]. 
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Chalmers slides illicitly from the fact that the completed func-
tional account of the mind, the one that we in fact settle on, might 
not need to appeal to any conscious states to the claim that any 
functional account whatsoever could get by without conscious-
ness. This rules out phenomenological causation right from the 
gate, a move that will not convert anyone to epiphenomenalism. 
Phenomenal access 
We can do more, though, than attack arguments for epiphe-
nomenalism that draw unjustified conclusions from the perfectly 
good distinction between access and experience. We can, for in-
stance, draw out the implications of the tight empirical link be-
tween these different aspects of consciousness. Without resorting 
to imaginary cases, it seems impossible to find any cases where 
direct availability of information for global control, the kind nec-
essary for reportability and rational use of the information, is present 
without subjective consciousness. Likewise for cases of experi-
ence without access. This certainly requires an explanation. In 
response to one of Block's suggested explanations of this empiri-
cal bond, Chalmers writes: "Block suggests that P-consciousness 
might "grease the wheels" of A-consciousness, but this cannot 
work. P-consciousness is redundant to the explanation of the physi-
cal mechanisms of A-consciousness, as the conceivability of the 
zombie shows: same physical mechanisms, same explanation of 
A-consciousness, no P-consciousness" [Chalmers 1997, p. 423]. 
But we have now seen that Chalmers has no right to make this 
conjecture. The zombie thought-experiment already depends on 
the redundancy of P-consciousness, so it cannot be used to estab-
lish the redundancy of P-consciousness. Thus we are free to ex-
plore the possibility that the striking correlation between access 
and experience is not a mere correlation, but that P-consciousness, 
in creatures like us anyway, is necessary for the kind of direct 
availability for global control that epiphenomenalists claim could 
go on in the dark. 
Robert Van Gulick argues that understanding the role of con-
sciousness requires more than understanding the inputs and the 
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end results of mental processes that involve conscious states. We 
also need to know how consciousness does its work: 
Nonconscious states might be able to make a simi-
lar contribution in the context of at least some sys-
tems... But insofar as such nonconscious states 
differ from our conscious states in the processes 
by which they make their equivalent contribution, 
there is an important respect in which they differ 
in their functional roles. [Van Gulick 1994, p. 27] 
As any cursory examination of the progress of artificial intelli-
gence would indicate, there is no machine that even comes close 
to the capacities of humans, and other animals, for efficient access 
to the information necessary to successfully navigate our way 
through the world. One apparent difference between us and ma-
chines is that we are conscious. Without committing ourselves to 
the premature conviction that machines could not be given these 
abilities without making machines conscious, it is worth consider-
ing the possibility that consciousness is the thing, or more plausi-
bly just one of the things, that happens to give us the edge. 
But what is so special about (phenomenal) consciousness that 
it should be such an advantageous feature of our mental lives? 
Van Gulick suggests that the distinctive character of phenomenal 
representations can be understood in terms of their semantic trans-
parency. "Indeed they are so transparent that we typically "look" 
right through them. Our experience is the experience of a world of 
familiar objects—of desks, chairs, coffee cups, and beech trees. 
Moreover this transparency is to some extent an immediately ex-
perienced feature of our conscious life..." [Van Gulick 1997, p. 
438]. He explains further: 
Any phenomenal object is delimited and defined 
within the representation in large part through the 
relations that it bears to other objects, which are 
in turn defined in part by the relations that they 
bear to it. It is in part the density of these 
interdefining relations that gives phenomenal ob-
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jects their "thickness", their objectivity. The fact 
that the phenomenal representation of objects in-
volves such dense and interdependent relations 
might help to account for its high degree of se-
mantic transparency; any phenomenal represen-
tation of an object would of necessity also be a 
representation of its myriad relations within its 
world, [ibid, pp. 438-439] 
The general idea seems to be that conscious representation of the 
world best reflects the complex structure of that world, so much so 
that consciousness thrusts us right into the world. To borrow a 
phrase from Hubert Dreyfus, consciousness allows us to be "in a 
situation" in virtue of the density of its deliverances from the envi-
ronment. To successfully navigate through the world and respond 
appropriately to its changes we need to employ mental representa-
tions with sufficiently rich content to quickly and efficiently relay 
detailed information about large chunks of the world. Phenom-
enally conscious mental representations seem to be perfect for the 
job: 
Sensuous manifolds provide a medium well suited 
for the representation of such rich and easily ac-
cessed spatio-temporal information. They have a 
continuous structure isomorphic to the spatio-tem-
poral domains they are used to represent. Thus 
by using qualia to delimit regions of such mani-
folds as representing objects, it is possible to im-
plicitly represent a large stock of information about 
the relative spatio-temporal relations of those ob-
jects, [ibid, p. 439] 
Consider the difference between trying to reach a completely un-
familiar location by using a list of directions and trying to get there 
by using a road map. If, unexpectedly, you should find a road 
closed due to construction, your directions may become useless, 
but with your map you will be able to quickly and easily identify 
an alternative route. This is because the map provides a thicker 
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representation of the environment, conveying more detailed infor-
mation in a very efficient manner. When it comes to making our 
way through the world, a picture is truly worth a thousand words. 
The "pictures" offered by conscious experience are so rich and 
detailed that they seem nothing like representations at all. From a 
phenomenological standpoint, the world is immediately present to 
mind. This proves extraordinarily helpful when it comes to com-
plex activities like driving a car, blocking a speeding hockey puck, 
or hunting down dinner. 
Of course, appealing to the semantic transparency of conscious 
representations cannot close the matter about the function of con-
sciousness. As Van Gulick admits, there is no reason to conclude 
a priori that representations with sufficiently rich content to allow 
human-like behavior could not be implemented in a machine which 
lacks phenomenal consciousness. But, in our own case, the first-
person perspective reveals a fertile stream of consciousness that 
is, as Van Gulick puts it, a world in its own right. This makes 
phenomenal consciousness a great candidate for the kind of repre-
sentational system required for direct availability for global con-
trol. 
It could be that phenomenally conscious states simply mirror 
nonconscious states that display the same semantic transparency. 
Ultimately, this skeptical conjecture will probably stand or fall 
with empirical evidence. For example, will we find that there is 
something about consciousness that, for creatures like us, makes it 
a particularly useful vehicle for information about the world, some 
feature that nonconscious states could not provide for us, or could 
only provide at too great a cost? Block speculates that the reason 
phenomenal consciousness was selected for by evolution is that it 
plays some special role in motivation [Block 1991, p. 670]. A 
very effective way to convey information about tissue damage to 
an organism is to make that damage hurt, and a very effective way 
to minimize tissue damage is to make the organism aversive to 
hurtfulness. It's not the only way. Mother nature might have de-
signed us so that we detected bodily damage through external per-
ception, like a sailor detects damage to his ship, to use Descartes' 
image. It seems plausible, though, that there is something about 
the kind of creatures we are—perhaps it is the kind of stuff we are 
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made of, or how small our heads must be so they will not be too 
cumbersome, or the nature of the environment in which we are 
embedded—that makes it especially advantageous for the world 
to feel and seem certain ways to us. We'll have to wait and see, 
but the tight empirical bond between access and experience, and 
the fact that consciousness seems so well-suited to provide a rich 
model of a complex world, should lead us to suspect that the 
epiphenomenalist's skeptical suspicions will remain ungrounded. 
Phenomenological potency and irreducibility 
I am not sure that the metaphor of experience "greasing the 
wheels" of access-consciousness is the most appropriate. It is bet-
ter to think of phenomenal consciousness as a particularly greasy 
wheel in its own right. This in no way threatens the idea that phe-
nomenological properties are irreducible. As Chalmers recognizes, 
"Although conscious states may play various causal roles, they are 
not defined by their causal roles. Rather, what makes them con-
scious is that they have a certain phenomenal feel, and this feel is 
not something that can be functionally defined away" [Chalmers 
1996, p. 105]. It could be, then, that every particular phenomeno-
logical mental event is a functional event, with potency in virtue 
of its phenomenological properties, although the functional account 
of that event, given in purely objective terms, will not capture those 
phenomenological properties. 
Ron McClamrock suggests the following explanation which 
draws on "HusserPs distinction between noeses—the real tempo-
ral parts (or 'proper components') of an experience—and noema— 
an act's essential intentional character (or 'correlate')": 
Even if the phenomenological globally supervenes 
on the computational, phenomenological proper-
ties needn't be coextensive with local syntactic 
properties of representations. Phenomenological 
properties could be context-dependent properties 
of those representations, or could be properties of 
groups, streams, or processes defined over repre-
sentations that might be multiply realizable at the 
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level of real token syntactic objects—that is, they 
might well be an irreducible higher level of or-
ganization of the system. 
Taking a hint from seeing the noema as intentional 
correlate rather than proper part of the intentional 
act, we might similarly in the naturalistic case find 
the best account of the object-directed phenom-
enological state not in the unity of some particu-
lar representational state, but in the constancy of 
the object of experience. The intentional or phe-
nomenological unities in experience—the tax-
onomy under which human action has its notice-
able systematicities as rational and goal-directed— 
needn't be real, temporal parts of the flow of con-
sciousness, but might be the (abstract, intentional) 
noematic unities of the real noetic phases of con-
sciousness. The shift in grain between the noetic 
and the noematic suggests the possibility of a par-
allel shift between the computational and the phe-
nomenological that leaves the latter as fundamen-
tally non-reducible and autonomous [McClamrock 
(1995) pp. 181-183]. 
The suggestion here is that, when explaining some behavior, it 
may often turn out that the best explanation is one that is framed in 
terms of how the world seems to the subject, and how the world 
seems to the subject may not always be definable in terms of the 
physical or computational properties of the subject. In general, we 
can make a case for higher-level causation whenever the causation 
is in virtue of higher-level properties [ibid, p. 43]. We can make 
sense of phenomenological causation in the same way. Even though 
each phenomenological event is identical with some physical and 
computational events, it may often be that what matters for ex-
plaining some behavior is the character of the state considered as a 
subjective experience. 
Following McClamrock's suggestion, consider the possibility 
that phenomenological properties are multiply realizable with re-
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spect to computational properties. A nice example of this is pro-
vided by Dennett (although Dennett himself certainly does not in-
tend it to help demonstrate the irreducibility and causal potency of 
phenomenological properties, since he denies the existence of phe-
nomenological properties). Dennett distinguishes between the 
content of a representation and the vehicle or medium of a repre-
sentation. So we may see a particular region as having a certain 
arrangement of colors; this is the content of our perceptual experi-
ence. But the bearing of this content can be achieved in many 
ways. For example, the perceptual experience having that content 
might be accomplished by a mechanism something like color-by-
numbers, where each region is labeled with a code for colors; al-
ternatively, the mechanism involved might be color-by-bit-map, 
where the color is filled in pixel by pixel. Or it might be the case 
that color is represented by color, like in a photograph [Dennett 
1991, p. 347-349]. 
If these are in fact legitimate possibilities, then we have a good 
example of how a particular kind of perceptual experience might 
be realized by many different computational states or processes. 
Now we can make sense of phenomenological causation in the 
same way we can make sense of any instance of higher-level cau-
sation, by asking whether there are any effects produced by this 
particular mental state that occur in virtue of its phenomenologi-
cal properties. "Fix the properties more directly responsible for 
the effect, and then note the independence of the effect from the 
various ways in which those properties might be produced... by 
different lower-level implementations" [McClamrock 1995, p. 48]. 
So, taking another example from Dennett, imagine that you walk 
into a room and perceive the wallpaper as covered by hundreds of 
identical pictures of Marilyn Monroe [Dennett 1991, pp. 354-356]. 
As Dennett points out, this experience could be carried out in a 
number of ways, but must we say that whatever effects are brought 
about by the experience are effects in virtue of the details of the 
computational process that underlies it? It seems, on the contrary, 
that the multiple realizability of the experience shows that many 
effects of the state or process occur in virtue of its phenomeno-
logical character. For example, upon seeing the wallpaper, I might 
say, "Hey, nice wallpaper". If I had not perceived the wallpaper as 
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covered by hundreds of identical Marilyns, if my perceptual expe-
rience did not have that particular phenomenological character, 
then I would not have uttered that sentence. But let's say that, in 
real life, the perceptual experience was accomplished by color-by-
numbers. Now fixing the phenomenological character but chang-
ing the computational process to color-by-bit-map, would I have 
still said "Hey, nice wallpaper". Yes, because what was relevant 
about my mental state as I entered the room, in terms of its linguis-
tic effect, was that it had the phenomenological character that it 
had, not that this phenomenological character was subserved by 
any particular computational process. 
On this view, there is certainly a sense in which phenomeno-
logical properties are dependent on computational properties. If 
you could take a snapshot of a person's perceptual experience of a 
particular object or event in the world, one could, in principle, 
identify the real representational features of that experience at that 
time which contribute to the conscious experience overall; but 
phenomenological properties are causal in virtue of their unifica-
tion of particular representations into the "perceived object as such", 
or in general, the perceived world as such. Objects can be per-
ceived as the same objects throughout variations in the details of 
the particular representations that make up the perceptual experi-
ences. As Van Gulick puts it, we most immediately perceive a 
"thick", unified world, not a world of discrete properties and events. 
McClamrock notes that it is in virtue of the stability of this world 
as perceived that much of our systematic behavior is to be ex-
plained; our behavior can, of course, only be explained by under-
standing how we perceive the world. A phenomenological ac-
count of consciousness would, ideally, specify the way the world 
seems to us as perceivers and agents who have to get around in 
that world [ibid, pp. 183-184]. That is, it would explain the unique 
nature of our phenomenological access to the world, an explana-
tion that would certainly feed back into any functional account of 
our behavior. Phenomenological properties, then, depend, at least 
in part, on objectively describable functional properties, and they 
have effects on behavior in virtue of the way they present a unified 
world to the subject; and yet their multiple realizability by various 
particular representations and their context- dependence on the 
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world in which the subject is embedded rule out their reducibility 
to objective physical or functional properties. 
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